Skip to content

Security Operations

  • Evidence is information presented in a court of law to confirm or dispel a fact that’s under contention.
  • Sources of legal evidence that can be presented in a court of law generally falls into one of four major categories:
    • Direct Evidence: Oral testimony or a written statement based on information gathered through a witness’s five senses (in other words, an eyewitness account) that proves or disproves a specific fact or issue.
    • Real (or physical) Evidence: Tangible objects from the actual crime, such as the tools or weapons used and any stolen or damaged property; may also include visual or audio surveillance tapes generated during or after the event. Physical evidence from a computer crime is not always available.
    • Documentary Evidence: Includes originals and copies of business records, computer-generated and computer-stored records, manuals, policies, standards, procedures, and log files. Most evidence presented in a computer crime case is documentary evidence. The hearsay rule is an extremely important test of documentary evidence that must be understood and applied to this type of evidence.
    • Demonstrative Evidence: Used to aid the court’s understanding of a case. Opinions are considered to be demonstrative evidence and may be expert (based on personal expertise and facts) or nonexpert (based on facts only). Other examples of demonstrative evidence includes models, simulations, charts, and illustrations.
  • Other types of evidence that may fall into one or more of the major categories include:
    • Best evidence: Original, unaltered evidence, which courts prefer over secondary evidence.
    • Secondary evidence: A duplicate or copy of evidence, such as a tape backup, screen capture, or photograph.
    • Corroborative evidence: Evidence that supports os substantiates other evidence presented in a case.
    • Conclusive evidence: Incontrovertible and irrefutable evidence.
    • Circumstantial evidence: Relevant facts that can’t be directly or conclusively connected to other events, but about which a reasonable person can make a reasonable inference.
  • The best evidence rule, defined in the US Federal Rules of Evidence, states that “to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is [ordinarily] required.”
  • The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, define an exception to this rule as “[if] data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an ‘original’.”
  • Thus, data extracted from a computer - if that data is a fair and accurate representation of the original data - satisfies the best evidence rule and may be introduced into court proceedings as such.
  • Hearsay evidence is evidence that’s not based on personal, firsthand knowledge of a witness but comes from other sources.
  • Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay evidence normally is not admissible in court. This rule exists to prevent unreliable testimony from improperly influencing the outcome of a trial.
  • Several courts have acknowledged that the hearsay rules are applicable to computer-stored records containing human statements but are not applicable to computer-generated records untouched by human hands.
  • Perhaps the most successful and commonly applied test of admissibility for computer records, in general, has been the business records exception, established in the Federal Rules of Evidence for records or regularly conducted activity that meet the following criteria:
    • Made at (contemporaneously) or near the time when the act occurred
    • Made by a person who has knowledge of the business process or from information transmitted by a person who has knowledge of the business process
    • Made and relied on during the regular conduct of business or in the furtherance of the business, as verified by the custodian or other witness who is familiar with the records’ use
    • Kept for motives that tend to ensure their accuracy
    • In the custody of the witness on a regular basis (as required by the chain of evidence)
  • The chain of evidence establishes accountability for the handling of evidence throughout the evidence life cycle.
  • To be admissible, computer-generated evidence must be:
    • Relevant: It must tend to prove or disprove facts that are relevant and material to the case.
    • Reliable: It must be reasonably proved that what is presented as evidence is what was originally collected and that the evidence itself is reliable. This proof is established in part through proper evidence handling and the chain of custody..
    • Legally Permissible: It must be obtained through legal means. Evidence that’s not legally permissible may include evidence obtained through the following means:
      • Illegal search and seizure: Law enforcement personnel must obtain a court order. But non-law enforcement personnel, such as a supervisor or system administrator, may be able to conduct an authorized search under some circumstances.
      • Illegal wiretaps or phone taps: Anyone conducting wiretaps or phone taps must obtain a court order.
      • Entrapment or Enticement: Entrapment encourages a person to commit a crime that they may have had no intention of committing. Conversely, enticement lures a person toward certain evidence (e.g., honeypot) after they have already committed a crime. Enticement isn’t necessarily illegal, but it does raise certain ethical arguments and may not be admissible in court.
      • Coercion: Coerced testimony or confessions are not legally permissible. Coercion involves compelling a person to provide evidence involuntarily through the use of threats, violence (torture), bribery, trickery, or intimidation.
      • Unauthorized or improper monitoring: Active monitoring must be properly authorized and conducted in a standard manner; users must be notified that they may be subject to monitoring.

Chain of Custody and the Evidence Life Cycle

Section titled “Chain of Custody and the Evidence Life Cycle”
  • The chain of custody (or chain of evidence) provides accountability and protection for evidence throughout its entire life cycle and includes the following information, which is normally kept in an evidence log:
    • People involved (who): Identify any and all people who discovered, collected, seized, analyzed, stored, preserved, transported, or otherwise controlled the evidence; also identify any witness or other people who were present during any of these activities
    • Description of evidence (what): Provide specific information about the evidence’s location when it was discovered, analyzed, stored, or transported
    • Date/time (when): Record the date and time when evidence is discovered, collected, seized, analyzed, stored, or transported; also record date-and-time information for any evidence log entires associated with the evidence
    • Methods used (how): Provide specific information about how evidence was discovered, collected, stored, preserved, or transported
  • The evidence life cycle describes the various phases of evidence, from its initial discovery to its final disposition. The evidence life cycle has the following five stages:
    • Collection and identification
    • Analysis
    • Storage, preservation, and transportation
    • Presentation in court
    • Final disposition, such as return to owner or destroy (for copies)
  • Collecting evidence involves taking that evidence into custody.
  • In general, law enforcement officials can search and/or seize computers and other electronic devices under any of four circumstances:
    • Voluntary or Consensual: The owner of the computer or electronic evidence can freely surrender the evidence.
    • Subpoena: A court issues a subpoena to a person, ordering that person to deliver the evidence to the court.
    • Search warrant or Anton Piller order: A search warrant is issued to a law enforcement official by the court, allowing that official to search and seize specific evidence. An Anton Piller order allows the premises to be searched and evidence seized without warning, usually to prevent possible destruction of evidence.
    • Exigent circumstances: If possible causes exists and the destruction of evidence is imminent, that evidence may be searched or seized without a warrant.
  • When evidence is collected, it must be marked and identified properly to ensure that it can be presented in court properly as actual evidence gathered from the scene or incident. The collected evidence must be recorded in an evidence log with the following information:
    • A description of the piece of evidence, including specific information such as make, model, serial number, physical appearance, material condition, and preexisting damage
    • The name(s) of the person or people who discovered and collected the evidence
    • The exact date and time, specific location, and circumstances of the discovery/collection
  • Additionally, the evidence must be marked according to the following guidelines:
    • Mark the evidence. If possible, without damaging the evidence, mark the piece of evidence with the collecting person’s initials, the date, and the case number (if known). Seal the evidence in an appropriate container, and again, mark the container with the same information
    • Use an evidence tag. If the actual evidence cannot be marked, attach an evidence tag with the information in the preceding item, seal the evidence, and tag it in an appropriate container, and mark the container with the same information.
    • Seal the evidence. Seal the container with evidence tape, and mark the tape in a manner that will clearly indicate any tampering or altering of the evidence.
    • Protect the evidence. Use extreme caution when collecting and marking evidence, to ensure that it’s not damaged. If you’re using plastic bags for evidence containers, make sure they’re static-free, to protect magnetic media.
  • Analysis involves examining the evidence for information pertinent to the case.
  • Analysis should be conducted with extreme caution - and only be experienced properly trained personnel - to ensure the evidence is not altered, damaged, or destroyed.
  • All evidence must be stored properly in a secure facility and preserved to prevent damage or contamination from various hazards, including intense heat or cold, extreme humidity, water, magnetic fields, and vibration.
  • Evidence not properly protected may be inadmissible in court, and the party responsible for collection and storage may be liable.
  • Care must be exercised during transportation to ensure that evidence is not lost, temporarily misplaced, damaged, or destroyed.
  • Evidence to be presented in court must continue to follow the chain of custody and be handled with the same care at all other times in the evidence life cycle. This process continues throughout the trial until all testimony related to the evidence is completed and the trials has concluded, or the case is settled or dismissed.
  • After the conclusion of the trial or other disposition, evidence is normally returned to its proper owner.
  • Under some circumstances, however, certain evidence may be ordered destroyed, such as contraband, drugs, or drug paraphernalia.
  • Any evidence obtained through a search warrant is legally under the control of the court, possibly requiring the original owner to petition the court for its return.
  • Complete and accurate recordkeeping is critical to each investigation.
  • An investigation’s report is intended to be a complete record of an investigation and usually includes:
    • Incident investigators, including their qualifications and contact information
    • Names of the parties interviewed, including their roles, involvement, and contact information
    • List of all evidence collected, including chain(s) of custody
    • Tools used to examine or process evidence, including versions
    • Samples and sampling methodologies used, if applicable
    • Computers used to examine, process, or store evidence, including a description of configuration
    • Root-cause analysis of the incident, if applicable
    • Conclusions and opinions of the investigators
    • Hearings or proceedings
    • Parties to whom the report is delivered
  • An investigation should begin immediately upon report of an alleged computer crime, policy violation, or incident.
  • Any incident should be handled, at least initially, as a computer crime investigation or policy violation until a preliminary investigation determines otherwise.
  • Various investigative techniques may be required, depending on the goal of the investigation or applicable laws and regulations.
  • The general steps of the investigative process are:
    1. Detect and contain an incident. Early detection is critical to a successful investigation. Unfortunately, computer-related incidents usually involve passive or reactive detection techniques (such as the review of audit trails and accidental discovery), which often leave a cold evidence trail. Containment minimizes further loss or damage. The computer incident response team (CIRT), normally is responsible for conducting an investigation. The CIRT should be notified or activated as quickly as possible after a computer crime is detected or suspected.
    2. Notify management. Management must be notified of any investigations as soon as possible. Knowledge of the investigations should be limited to as few people as possible and on a need-to-know basis. Out-of-band communication methods (reporting in person) should be used to ensure that an intruder does not intercept sensitive communications about the investigation.
    3. Conduct a preliminary investigation. This preliminary analysis determines whether an incident or crime actually occurred. Most incidents turn out to be honest mistakes rather the malicious conduct. This step includes reviewing the complaint or report, inspecting damage, interviewing witnesses, examining logs, and identifying further investigation requirements.
    4. Determine whether the organization should disclose that the crime occurred. First, and most important, determine whether laws or regulations require that organization to disclose a crime or incident. Next, by coordinating with a public relations or public affairs official of the organization, determine whether the organization wants to disclose this information.
    5. Conduct the investigation. Conducting the investigation involves three activities:
      1. Identify potential suspects. Potential suspects include organization insiders and outsiders. One standard discriminator that helps identify and eliminate potential suspects is the MOM (Motive, Opportunity, and Means) test: Did the suspect have the motive, opportunity, and means?
      2. Identify potential witnesses. Determine whom can be interviewed and should conduct the interviews. One should be careful not to alert any potential suspects to the investigation; one needs to focus on obtaining facts, not opinions, in witness statements.
      3. Prepare for search and seizure. Identify the types of systems and evidence planned to be searched or seized, designate and train the search and seizure team members (normally, members of the CIRT), obtain and serve proper search warrants (if required), and determine the potential risk to the system during a search-and-seizure effort.
    6. Report your findings. The results of the investigation, including evidence, should be reported to management and turned over to proper law enforcement officials or prosecutors as appropriate.

Digital forensics tools, tactics, and procedures

Section titled “Digital forensics tools, tactics, and procedures”
  • Digital forensics is the science of conducting a computer incident investigation to determine what has happened and who is responsible, and to collect legally admissible evidence for use in subsequent legal proceedings, such as criminal investigations, internal investigation, or lawsuit.
  • The types of forensic data-gathering techniques include:
    • Hard drive forensics: Specialized tools are used to create one or more forensically identical copies of a computer’s hard drive. A device called a write blocker is typically used to prevent any possible alterations to the original drive. Cryptographic checksums can be used to verify that a forensic copy is an exact duplicate of the original. Then tools are used to examine the contents of the hard drive to determine:
      • Last known state of the computer
      • History of files accessed
      • History of files created
      • History of files deleted
      • History of programs executed
      • History of websites visited by a browser
      • History of attempts by the user to remove evidence
    • Live forensics: Specialized tools are used to examine a running system, including:
      • Running processes
      • Currently open files
      • Contents of main storage (RAM)
      • Keystrokes
      • Communications traffic in and out of the computer
    • Live forensics are difficult to perform because the tools used to collect information can affect the system being examined.
  • Key artifacts that may be collected during an investigation may include data, computers, mobile devices, servers (physical or virtual), network equipment (such as routers and switches), and security equipment (such as firewalls). These artifacts may contain indicators of compromise (IoC) that can be preserved as evidence to support an investigation.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPs)

Section titled “Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPs)”
  • Intrusion detection is a passive technique used to detect unauthorized activity on a network.
  • Three types of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be found in data centers:
    • Network-based: Consists of a separate device attached to a network that listens to all network traffic by using various methods to detect anomalous activity.
    • Host-based: A subset of network-based IDS in which only the network traffic destined for a particular host is monitored.
    • Wireless: Another type of network intrusion detection that focuses on wireless intrusion by scanning for rogue access points
  • Both network- and host-based IDS use a couple of techniques:
    • Signature-based
    • Reputation-based
    • Anomaly-based

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)

Section titled “Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)”
  • Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions provide real-time collection, analysis, correlation, and presentation of security logs and alerts generated by various network sources.

Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)

Section titled “Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)”
  • A Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) solution takes a SIEM one step further through the automation of repeatable tasks as a result of an event that has been detected.
  • Egress monitoring (or extrusion detection) is the process of monitoring outbound traffic to discover potential data leakage (or loss).
  • Data loss prevention (DLP) systems are often used to detect the exfiltration of sensitive data, such as Personally Identifiable Information (PII), or Protected Health Information (PHI) in email messages, data uploads, PNG or JPEG images, and other form of communication. DLP technologies perform deep packet inspection (DPI) to decrypt and inspect outbound traffic that is TLS encrypted.
  • DLP systems can be used to disable the use of removable media driver interfaces on servers and workstations, as well as to encrypt data written to removable media so that only systems with the same organization’s DLP agent can read the contents of the removable media drive.
  • Static DLP tools are used to discover sensitive and proprietary data in databases, file servers, and other data storage systems.
  • To the greatest extent possible, log information should be synchronized to a network time (NTP) server to ensure that log data from disparate sources can be correlated accurately.
  • Logs should be stored centrally and securely to ensure that the data collected is immutable and can be readily ingested into various security analytics platforms, SIEM solutions, and other security tools for log aggregation, analysis, and correlation.
  • Appropriate retention periods for log information should be defined and implemented based on legal or regulatory compliance requirements.
  • Security analysts may use tools to proactively search for perviously unknown Indicators of Compromise (IoC) or ongoing (unremediated) threats in an activity known as threat hunting.
  • Machine-readable threat intel feeds use any of several formats, including CSV, Structured Threat Information Exchange (STIX), Extensible Markup Language (XML), JSON, Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC), and Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII).
  • Threat intel tools enable an organization to detect the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that threat actors use to attack networks and systems.
  • Security planning and analysis must be integral part of every organization’s resource provisioning processes, as well as throughout the life cycle of all resources. Important security considerations include:
    • Provisioning: Security should be consulted any time the organization is considering introducing new equipment, such as a Wi-Fi access point or network router from a manufacturer whose products have not previously been deployed in the environment. This approach ensures that security can assess any known risks associated with the new equipment and its impact on the organization’s overall security posture.
    • Asset management (or inventory): Maintaining a complete, accurate inventory is critical to ensure that all potential vulnerabilities and risks in an environment can be identified, assessed, and addressed.
    • Baselining: Establishing a baseline helps security teams tune security events and alerts that are received and can also be used to feed user and entity behavior analysis/capabilities (UEBA) in security tools deployed throughout the environment.
    • Change management: Change management processes are used to strictly control changes to systems in production environments so that only duly requested and approved changes are made.
    • Configuration management: Configuration management processes need to be implemented and strictly enforced to ensure that information resources are operated in a safe and secure manner. Organizations typically implement an automated configuration management database (CMDB) that is part of a system configuration management system used to manage asset inventory data. Often, this database is also used to manage the configuration history of systems.
    • Drift: In the context of configuration management, drift is the gradual change in a system’s configuration from an established baseline or standard.
    • Physical assets: Physical assets must be protected against loss, damage, or theft. Valuable or sensitive data stored on physical asset may far exceed the value of the asset itself.
    • Virtual assets: VM sprawl has increasingly become an issue for organizations with the popularity of virtualization technology and software-defined networks (SDN).
    • Cloud assets: It is important to keep track of cloud assets, such as SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS solutions. Ultimately, an organization is the one responsible for the security and privacy of its applications and data - not the cloud service provider. Issues of data residency and transborder data flow need to be considered. Cloud access security brokers (CASB), can detect access and use of cloud-based services. CASBs give an organization more visibility into its sanctioned and unsanctioned use of cloud services.
    • Applications: This category includes commercial and custom applications, private clouds, web services, SaaS products, and the interfaces and integrations among application components. Securing the provisioning of these assets requires strict access controls; only designated administrators should be able to deploy and configure them.
    • Automation

Apply Foundational Security Operations Concept

Section titled “Apply Foundational Security Operations Concept”

q

  • Common tasks within a change management process are:

    1. Request the change
    2. Review the change
    3. Approve/reject the change
    4. Test the change
    5. Schedule and implement the change
    6. Document the change
  • Common steps within an effective `patch management program:

    • Evaluate patches
    • Test patches
    • Approve the patches
    • Deploy the patches
    • Verify that patches are deployed
  • Patch Tuesday and Exploit Wednesday

  • Two common elements of a vulnerability management program are routine vulnerability scans and periodic vulnerability assessments.